

Center *for the Study of the* American Constitution

NO. 11: THE FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST DEBATE OVER THE SENATE

During the Confederation period most of the states had bicameral legislatures. Only Pennsylvania and Georgia had single-house assemblies. The Confederation Congress was also unicameral with each state having only one vote despite differences in size, population, and wealth. The shortcomings of these few unicameral legislatures were so apparent that there was virtually no debate in the Constitutional Convention over the establishment of a bicameral Congress. But there was considerable debate over representation in each house.

Early in the Convention, delegates agreed that the House of Representatives should be apportioned among the states on the basis of population. Large-state delegates wanted the same principle to govern representation in the Senate, while small-state delegates wanted the Senate to reflect the states' equality. An eventual compromise determined that the Senate would be composed of two members from every state. In both houses of Congress, voting would be by individual—not by states.

During the debate over ratification, large-state Antifederalists attacked representative equality in the Senate as oppressive to their populations. If Delaware, with less than ten percent of Virginia's population, had the same representation as the Old Dominion, how could anyone imagine that Virginians were properly represented? Antifederalists also denounced the aristocratic nature of the Senate. Senators were to be elected by their state legislatures for six-year terms. Neither mandatory rotation in office nor recall was provided for in the Constitution, although both were provided for in the Articles of Confederation. Antifederalists also condemned the power of the Senate to amend money bills. The English House of Lords could not amend but only accept or reject money bills.

Antifederalists feared that senators might be returned to office repeatedly, possibly serving for life. Equally problematic for Antifederalists was the Senate's size. If all thirteen original states came into the union, the first Senate would have twenty-six members and a quorum of only fourteen could conduct business. Such a small number might be susceptible to bribery and corruption.

Some Antifederalists saw in the Senate's responsibility to advise the U.S. president and consent to major appointments a violation of the separation of powers. How could the Senate be expected to convict impeached corrupt officeholders after having confirmed their appointment? The Senate and president's shared power in making treaties also confounded some opponents of the Constitution. Who would be held responsible for unwise treaties? In the minds of some Antifederalists, the shared responsibility meant that there would be no accountability for malfeasance in office. A privy council would more adequately advise the president, Antifederalists argued. Antifederalists also decried the vice president's role as president of the Senate. The vice president's power to cast tie-breaking votes not only violated the separation of powers principle, but also gave one state an extra vote in the Senate. Antifederalists argued that the Senate should elect its own presiding officer from among its members.

Federalists justified the equality of the states in the Senate on the basis of expediency. Without this concession to small states, agreement in the Constitutional Convention would have been unobtainable. Furthermore, the different constituency of the Senate, coupled with its members' six-year term of office and arrangement into "classes" (one-third of the senators being elected every two years), promised greater stability for Congress.

The Senate's role in advising the president on appointments and treaties was justified in several ways. The Senate, with its six-year term, Federalists suggested, would be the repository of much wisdom and experience, both of which should be made available to the president. A privy council would be expensive, would increase the layers of government, and would not necessarily be an improvement on the Senate as a means of advising the president.

To counter the charge of the Senate's aristocratic nature, Federalists pointed out that the Senate could do nothing by itself. In passing legislation, the Senate needed the agreement of the House of Representatives. In making treaties and appointments, the Senate acted in conjunction with, and most probably in response to, the actions of the president. If Senators violated their trust, they would not be reelected by their state legislatures. ■

ANTIFEDERALIST DOCUMENTS

GEORGE MASON TO GEORGE WASHINGTON, GUNSTON HALL, 7 OCTOBER 1787

From this fatal Defect of a constitutional Council has arisen the improper Power of the Senate, in the Appointment of public Officers, and the alarming Dependence & Connection between that Branch of the Legislature, and the supreme Executive.—Hence also sprung that unnecessary & dangerous Officer the Vice President; who for want of other Employment, is made President of the Senate; thereby dangerously blending the executive & legislative Powers; besides always giving to some one of the States an unnecessary & unjust Pre-eminence over the others. . . .

By declaring all Treaties supreme Laws of the Land, the Executive & the Senate have, in many Cases, an exclusive Power of Legislation; which might have been avoided, by proper Distinctions with Respect to Treaties, and requiring the Assent of the House of Representatives, where it cou'd be done with Safety. . . .

CINCINNATUS IV: TO JAMES WILSON, ESQ., NEW YORK JOURNAL, 22 NOVEMBER 1787

I come now, sir, to the most exceptionable part of the Constitution—the senate. In this, as in every other part, you are in the line of your profession, and on that ground assure your fellow citizens, that—“perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason, than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the Fœderal Senate.” . . .

To judge on this question, it is proper to examine minutely into the constitution and powers of the senate;

and we shall then see with what anxious and subtle cunning it is calculated for the proposed purpose. 1st. It is removed from the people, being chosen by the legislatures—and exactly in the ratio of their removal from the people, do aristocratic principles constantly infect the minds of man. 2d. They endure, two thirds for four, and one-third for six years, and in proportion to the duration of power, the aristocratic exercise of it, and attempts to extend it, are invariably observed to increase. . . .

By this time I hope it is evident from reason and authority, that in the constitution of the senate there is much cunning and little wisdom; that we have much to fear from it, and little to hope, and then it must necessarily produce a baneful aristocracy, by which the democratic rights of the people will be overwhelmed. . . .

LUTHER MARTIN: GENUINE INFORMATION IV BALTIMORE MARYLAND GAZETTE 8 JANUARY 1788

. . . the senators are to be chosen for *six* years instead of being chosen *annually*; instead of being paid by *their States* who send them, *they* in conjunction with the other branch, are to *pay themselves* out of the treasury of the United States; and are not liable to be *recalled* during the period for which they are chosen—Thus, Sir, for *six years* the *senators* are rendered totally and absolutely *independent of their States*, of *whom* they ought to be the *representatives*, without *any bond or tie* between them—During *that time* they may join in measures *ruinous and destructive to their States*, even such as should *totally annihilate* their *State governments*, and their States *cannot recall* them, *nor exercise any controul over them*. . . . The senate, Sir, is so constituted, that they are not only to compose one branch of the legislature, but by the second section of the second article, they are to *com-*

pose a privy council for the President; hence it will be necessary, that they should be, in a great measure, a permanent body, constantly residing at the seat of government. Seventy years is estimated for the life of a man; it can hardly be supposed, that a senator, especially from the States remote from the seat of empire, will accept of an appointment which must estrange him for six years from his State, without giving up to a great degree his prospects in his own State. If he has a family, he will take his family with him to the place where the government shall be fixed, that will become his home, and there is every reason to expect that his future views and prospects will centre in the favours and emoluments either of the general government, or of the government of that State where the seat of empire is established:—In either case, he is lost to his own State. . . .

HAMPDEN, *PITTSBURGH GAZETTE* 16 FEBRUARY 1788

. . . in the second clause of the second Article, it is declared that the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, is to make treaties. Here the supreme executive magistrate is officially connected with the highest branch of the legislature; and . . . [treaties] shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. When we consider the extent of treaties; that in fixing the tariff of trade, the imposts and port duties generally are or may be fixed; and by a large construction, which interested rulers are never at a loss to give to any constitutional power. Treaties may be extended to almost every legislative object of the general government. . . . And from this power of making treaties, the House of Representatives, which hath the best chance of possessing virtue and public confidence is entirely excluded. Indeed, I see nothing to hinder the President and Senate, at a convenient crisis, to declare themselves hereditary and supreme, and the lower house altogether useless, and to abolish what shadow of the state constitutions remain by this power alone. . . .

BRUTUS XVI *NEW YORK JOURNAL*, 10 APRIL 1788

The term for which the senate are to be chosen, is in my judgment too long, and no provision being made for a rotation will, I conceive, be of dangerous consequence. . . .

A rotation in the senate, would also in my opinion be of great use. It is probable that senators once chosen for a state will, as the system now stands, continue in office for life. The office will be honorable if not lucrative. The persons who occupy it will probably wish to continue in it, and therefore use all their influence and that of their friends to continue in office.—Their friends will be numerous and powerful, for they will have it in their power to confer great favors; besides it will before long be considered as disgraceful not to be re-elected. It will therefore be considered as a matter of delicacy to the character of the senator not to return him again.—Every body acquainted with public affairs knows how difficult it is to remove from office a person who is long been in it. It is seldom done except in cases of gross misconduct. It is rare that want of competent ability procures it. To prevent this inconvenience I conceive it would be wise to determine, that a senator should not be eligible after he had served for the period assigned by the constitution for a certain number of years; perhaps three would be sufficient. A farther benefit would be derived from such an arrangement; it would give opportunity to bring forward a greater number of men to serve their country, and would return those, who had served, to their state, and afford them the advantage of becoming better acquainted with the condition and politics of their constituents. . . .

GEORGE MASON'S SPEECH IN THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION, 18 JUNE 1788

It has been wittily observed, that the Constitution has married the President and Senate—has made them man and wife. I believe the consequence that generally results from marriage, will happen here. They will be continually supporting and aiding each other: They will always consider their interests as united. We know the advantage the few have over the many. They can with facility act in concert and on an uniform system: They may join scheme and plot against the people without any chance of detection. The Senate and President will form a combination that cannot be prevented by the Representatives. The Executive and Legislative powers thus connected, will destroy all balances: This would have been prevented by a Constitutional Council to aid the President in the discharge of his office; vesting the Senate at the same time with power of impeaching them. Then we should have real responsibility. In its present form, the guilty try themselves. The President is tried by his counsellors. He is not removed from office during his trial. . . .

FEDERALIST DOCUMENTS

AN AMERICAN CITIZEN II: ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PHILADELPHIA *INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER*, 28 SEPTEMBER 1787

. . . As our President bears *no resemblance to a King*, so we shall see the Senate have *no similitude to nobles*.

First then not being hereditary, their *collective* knowledge, wisdom and virtue are not precarious, *for by these qualities alone are they to obtain their offices*; and they will have none of the *peculiar* follies and vices of those men, *who possess power merely because their fathers held it before them*, for they will be educated (under equal advantages and with equal prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons of a free people. . . . As the Senators *are still to be elected by the legislatures of the states*, there can be no doubt of *equal safety and propriety* in their future appointment, especially as no further pecuniary qualification is required by the constitution.

They can hold *no other office* civil or military under the United States, nor can they join *in making provisions for themselves*, either by creating new places or encreasing the emoluments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed them, they will not be induced to aim at an increase or perpetuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the people of which those sons will be a part. . . .

No ambitious, undeserving or unexperienced *youth* can acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous wealth or most powerful connections, *till thirty years have ripened his abilities and fully discovered his merits to his country*—a more rational ground of preference surely than mere property.

REMARKER BOSTON *INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE*, 17 JANUARY 1788

. . . Settle in your minds the principles of an aristocracy, and then examine the Senate, its origin, its power, and its existance, and you will not find a single feature existing in it, which bears the least degree of resemblance to aristocratic deformity. Even their complexions are perfectly distinct. The Senate must derive their origin *from the people*; their power is limited *by the people*, and they are

responsible *to the people*. It is easy to convince any honest mind, that the Senate is by no means a-kin to a body of nobles. This will appear by taking the properties of the latter, and applying them to the former. It is said that aristocracy may be either elective or hereditary. It is with this government, as with monarchy, in this respect. However an elective aristocracy, may seem to promise a good administration, experience shows that for some reason or other, practice will not advocate the preference. Contention here among the people always endangers the springs of government. Hereditary aristocracy in those countries, where it hath existed, has always been found to comport better with national happiness, than one that is elective. . . . But, my fellow-citizens, for a moment call to mind the origin, the mode of existance, and the power of the Senate in this Constitution. Their very being is derived from the people, their power is limited, and after all, they are obliged to render an account to the *people* for their conduct, and may at any time be impeached for malpractices. Beware of false pretensions, and trust not to the crafty insinuations of designing men. . . . The idea of an aristocracy in the Senate, is absurd in another view. . . . Here is to be no qualification of wealth. Wisdom and uprightness are the most essential. . . .

PUBLIUS: THE FEDERALIST 62 NEW YORK *INDEPENDENT JOURNAL* 27 FEBRUARY 1788

The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All that need be remarked is that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought moreover to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

. . . It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monu-

ments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well constituted senate? . . .

The mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the states, is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. . . .

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.

In the first place it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. . . . Every nation . . . whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbours. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is to day can guess what it will be to morrow. . . .

No government any more than an individual will long be respected, without being truly respectable, nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.

PUBLIUS: THE FEDERALIST 64 NEW YORK *INDEPENDENT JOURNAL* 5 MARCH 1788

. . . If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue that as an assembly of select electors possess in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the president and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several states or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged.

. . . It was wise therefore in the convention to provide not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political informations and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way, as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men, for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information, will be preserved.

PUBLIUS: THE FEDERALIST 76 NEW YORK *PACKET*, 1 APRIL 1788

. . . it has been objected, that the President by the influence of the power of nomination may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. . . . But it is as little to be doubted that there is always a large proportion of the body, which consists of independent and public spirited men, who have an influential weight in the councils of the nation. . . . Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose, that the executive might occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate; yet the supposition

that he could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body would be forced and improbable.—A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members; but that the necessity of its co-operation in the business of appointments will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only reliance. The

constitution has provided some important guards against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body: It declares that “No Senator, or representative shall, during the time *for which he was elected*, be appointed to any civil office under the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.” ■

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR A SOCRATIC SEMINAR

- Did Antifederalists overstate their case that the Senate was aristocratic?
- Did Federalists overstate the Senate’s value in providing stability in governance?
- In your estimation, were Antifederalists accurate in linking senators’ lengthier term of office with the idea of aristocracy? Was the Federalist rebuttal effective?
- What do Antifederalist concerns about the Senate and the presidency’s relationship reveal about American ideas of government power? Are any of these concerns still relevant?
- To what extent does the blending of powers between the Senate and the president create a stable system of government?
- Is the blending of powers between separate branches ever appropriate?



TEACHING TOOLS

I. A Comparison of Federalist and Antifederalist Arguments Over the Senate

1. Select eleven students from the class to read the documents. Each student should read one document. Six students will read the Antifederalist selections; five will read the Federalist selections.
2. The rest of the class should be divided into Federalist and Antifederalist groups. Each student should have the T-chart below to serve as evaluators. The Antifederalist evaluators will individually listen, record, and rate the arguments of each of the Federalist readings. The Federalist evaluators will also individually listen, record, and rate the arguments of each of the Antifederalist readings.
3. As the evaluators listen to each document being read, they should take notes using the T-chart. Their notes should be summaries of the key ideas from the documents. Evaluators can use a 1-10 scale to rate the effectiveness of arguments made in each document. Use the blanks provided.

Antifederalist Arguments	Federalist Arguments
George Mason Letter _____	An American Citizen II _____
Cincinnatus IV _____	Remarker _____
Luther Martin _____	Publius: The Federalist 62 _____
Hampden _____	Publius: The Federalist 64 _____
Brutus XVI _____	Publius: The Federalist 76 _____
George Mason Speech _____	

4. When all of the documents have been read, have the Federalist evaluators meet among themselves and the Antifederalist evaluators meet among themselves to reach a consensus on the three best arguments from the opposition.
5. Once both groups have had an opportunity to discuss and rank the arguments, have a spokesperson report each group's findings to the class. The teacher can record their rankings.
6. After each side has made its assessment, the teacher can lead a discussion using the following questions:
 - Ask the Federalists, "What was the strongest argument made by the Antifederalists?"
 - Ask the Antifederalists, "What was the strongest argument made by the Federalists?"
 - Does the opposition's ranking of your arguments reflect your own ranking of them? Why or why not?

II. Elitist or Not?: Comparing the Arguments of "Cincinnatus" and "Remarker"

1. Divide the class into groups of 3–5 students. Half of the groups should read the Antifederalist "Cincinnatus" IV; the other half should read the Federalist "Remarker." As students read their documents, they should summarize and record the arguments made by the author using the chart below.

The Danger of the Senate Antifederalist, Cincinnatus IV	The Safety of the Senate Federalist, Remarker

2. After each group has had an opportunity to read and list the arguments of its author, have a representative from each group report its findings to the class. The groups representing the opposing perspective should pay particular attention to representatives' summary points. They will be asked to find and use arguments in their own piece as rebuttals to the opposition's points.
3. After groups from each side, Federalist and Antifederalist, have reported their findings, give all groups an opportunity to evaluate the opposition's summary points. They should then select from their text excerpts that would be an effective rebuttal.

4. The next step is to have one side begin with a summary statement. For example:

(The Charge) The Antifederalist side could start with:
Cincinnatus charges that the Senate will produce “a baneful aristocracy.”

(The Rebuttal) The Federalist side might respond with:
Remarker argues that the Senate’s origin is “from the people.”

5. Reverse the sequence in the next round: Federalists make an accusation from their text and Antifederalists select their rebuttal statement. Teachers may select a panel of judges to score the rebuttals in each round and keep a running score to determine the winner. The chart below would be useful for judges.

The Charge		The Rebuttal	
1.	F/AF		F/AF
2.	F/AF		F/AF
3.	F/AF		F/AF
4.	F/AF		F/AF

6. Conclude the lesson by leading a discussion using the following questions:

- In your opinion, did “Cincinnatus” overstate his case that the Senate was aristocratic?
- In your estimation, did “Remarker” successfully rebut the arguments of “Cincinnatus”?

III. Chicken Little vs. Mister Rogers: Analyzing the Rhetoric of Crisis and Calm

1. Divide the class into groups of 3-5 students. Half of these groups should read the Antifederalist documents. The other half should be assigned the Federalist documents.
2. All students should be given the appropriate chart to organize their reading and discussions in small groups.

Rhetoric of Crisis and Alarm Used by Antifederalists

G.M. to G.W./Mason Speech	Cincinnatus	Luther Martin
alarming	cunning	ruinous

Rhetoric of Calm and Reassurance Used by Federalists

An American Citizen	Remarker	Publius: The Federalist 64
collective knowledge	from the people	discretion

3. Have Antifederalist groups read and look for words in each of the documents that are extremely negative and alarming when describing the Senate or senators. Have the Federalist groups read and look for words that are favorable and calming when the Senate or senators are described. As students find these words, they should record them on their charts. Each chart has some prompts to get students started.

4. In their small groups, each side, Federalist and Antifederalist, should create a poem to be submitted in a “poetry challenge.” You can pair groups from each side—one Federalist, one Antifederalist—as challengers in the competition. Some suggestions might be:
- a limerick
 - a haiku
 - an iambic pentameter poem
 - a rap lyric
 - a spoken word or free verse poem
- Note:** Insist that groups incorporate as many words as possible that appear in their charts.
5. After groups have had a sufficient amount of time to create their poems, have each pair of groups—one Federalist, one Antifederalist—recite their work. The teacher can serve as judge and award points after each round of dueling poems.
6. Conclude the lesson by leading a discussion using the following questions:
- What does the use of crisis and calm rhetoric by Antifederalists and Federalists suggest about the debates occurring during the ratification process?
 - Was one side better at using rhetoric than the other?
 - Does the use of this kind of rhetoric help or hinder debate?

Vocabulary

George Mason to George Washington

1. *pre-eminence*: fame; distinction; importance
2. *assent*: agreement

“Cincinnatus” IV

1. *exceptionable*: offensive or obnoxious
2. *baneful*: destructive
3. *cunning*: deceitfulness; craftiness

Luther Martin: “Genuine Information” IV

1. *conjunction*: along with
2. *liable*: able
3. *rendered*: made
4. *privy council*: an advisory committee
5. *prospects*: professional and financial future
6. *emoluments*: payments; rewards

“Hampden”

1. *imposts*: taxes

“Brutus” XVI

1. *lucrative*: profitable
2. *confer*: grant
3. *constituents*: people who live in a particular area and vote

George Mason’s Speech in the Virginia Convention

1. *facility*: ability
2. *concert*: agreement
3. *scheme*: strategy or plan (often devious)
4. *discharge*: accomplish; perform

“An American Citizen” II

1. *similitude*: likeness or similarity
2. *precarious*: doubtful
3. *peculiar*: distinct or particular
4. *footing*: foundation
5. *propensity*: correctness
6. *pecuniary*: financial or monetary
7. *perpetuity*: indefiniteness

“Remarker”

1. *a-kin*: similar to
2. *contention*: argument; infighting
3. *comport*: be consistent
4. *pretensions*: assertions; allegations
5. *insinuations*: indirect suggestions
6. *designing*: plotting

“Publius”: *The Federalist 62*

1. *propensity*: tendency
2. *factionous*: divisive
3. *intemperate*: uncontrolled
4. *pernicious*: destructive; malicious
5. *tenure*: term
6. *voluminous*: massive; filling volumes
7. *admonitions*: counsels; advice
8. *mutability*: prone to change
9. *prudence*: discretion; carefulness
10. *derision*: scorn or mockery
11. *fluctuating*: variable; unstable
12. *calamitous*: tragic; disastrous
13. *promulged*: broadcast; disseminated

“Publius”: *The Federalist 64*

1. *discernment*: wise judgment
2. *merits*: deserves
3. *duration*: period
4. *rendering*: making
5. *obviate*: remove; eliminate
6. *succession*: series

“Publius”: *The Federalist 76*

1. *complaisance*: seeking to please
2. *supposition*: belief
3. *probity*: goodness or correctness; honesty
4. *salutary*: helpful; useful